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SECURITIES LAW: SECTION 307 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: IRRECONCILABLE
CONFLICT WITH THE ABA'S MODEL RULES
AND THE OKLAHOMA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT?
JENNIFER WHEELER*
L Introduction
An attorney has many roles in society - client representative, officer of the
legal system, and public citizen responsible forjustice, to name a few. ' Now,
thanks to a group of forty law professors, a former plaintiffs' attorney, and a
Congress faced with a disillusioned public in an important election year, an
attorney representing clients before the Securities and Exchange Commission
also has another title: corporate snitch.
A wave of corporate scandals that began in 2001 with the collapse of
Enron2 and continued into 2002 with disclosures of accounting discrepancies
at Qwest Communications3 and bankruptcy filings by Adelphia, 4 Global
Crossing,5 and WorldCom,6 culminated in 2002 in the most sweeping
corporate governance legislation in recent memory. In response to the
numerous scandals and the investing public's growing suspicion of corporate
America, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed corporate
governance legislation aimed at restoring the public's faith in the business
markets.
* Senior associate, McAfee & Taft A Professional Corporation, Oklahoma City, Okla.
J.D., 1997, University of Oklahoma; B.A., 1994, University of Tulsa.
1. OKLA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCr pmbl. (2002).
2. Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Files Voluntary Petitions for Chapter 11
Reorganization (Dec. 2, 2001), http:lwww.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases.
3. Press Release, Qwest Communications Int'l Inc., Qwest Communications Provides
Current Status of Ongoing Analysis of Its Accounting Policies and Practices (July 28, 2002),
http://www.qwest.com/aboutlmedialpressroom.
4. Current Report on Form 8-K, Adelphia Communications Corp. (Mar. 27, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (announcing potential $500 million liability in connection with
Chapter 11 filing of significant subsidiaries).
5. Press Release, Global Crossing Ltd., Hutchison Whampoa Limited and Singapore
Technologies Telemedia Pte. Ltd. Plan to Invest $750 Million in Global Crossing (Jan. 28,
2002), http://www.globalcrossing.comxml/news/2002/news rel_2002.xml.
6. Press Release, WorldCom, Inc., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy Court Protection (July
21, 2002), http://www.global.mci.com/news/releases/2002.
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The Senate and the House hastily adopted their respective corporate
governance bills, anxious to demonstrate their commitment to ending
widespread moral decay and flagrant abuses of power, even if only among
corporate executives. Just as hastily, Congress agreed to combine the two
bills into a single piece of legislation that purports to "protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant
to the securities laws."' On July 30, 2002, President George W. Bush signed
the bill into law, enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act),
legislation widely regarded as containing "the most far-reaching reforms of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."'
Although the Act did not necessarily restore investors' shaken confidence
or improve their depleted portfolios, it had, and will continue to have, a
dramatic effect on the lives and businesses of three character-types that
inevitably appear in each corporate scandal: the corporate executives, the
accountants, and the attorneys. Bypassing the numerous provisions in the Act
that address accounting-firm oversight, executive-officer liability, and
financial disclosure requirements, this Article focuses on section 307 of the
Act, "Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys."9
Section 307 and the rules promulgated by the SEC in accordance with it
have prompted concerns about their consequences on the relationships
between attorneys and their corporate clients. Notwithstanding this
widespread concern, in-house legal departments and law firms serving as
outside counsel to companies subject to the Act' ° can avoid any negative
repercussions from the Act and the SEC's related rules by adopting certain
precautionary measures and, more importantly, by simply remembering who
the client is.
To begin discussing the impact of the SEC's rules under section 307 on the
relationships between attorneys and their corporate clients, Part II of this
Article reviews the text of section 307 and examines the limited legislative
history of the provision. Specifically, Part I details the impetus behind
section 307 and explores the roles of those who contributed to its enact-
ment - including the surprisingly small role that the American Bar
Association played in passing the legislation.
Part II of this Article compares section 307 and the related SEC rules with
the existing ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct that address
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, pmbl., 116 Stat. 745, 745.
8. President George W. Bush, Remarks at Signing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July
30, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.htm.
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
10. The companies discussed in this Article are assumed to be "issuers" as defined in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
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attorneys' professional responsibilities. Part IH examines recommendations
by the ABA to amend the Model Rules and suggests that any conflicts
between the SEC's rules and the Model Rules are reconcilable.
Part IV discusses how the SEC's rules affect attorneys in Oklahoma and
correlate with Oklahoma's Rules of Professional Conduct. Part IV discusses
critical issues that in-house legal departments and law firms representing
companies as outside counsel should examine in connection with section 307
and the related SEC rules when deciding how best to conduct their corporate
practices in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment.
II. Section 307 - Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys
A. Section 307 and the SEC's Related Rules
Section 307 of the Act requires the SEC to issue rules establishing
minimum standards of conduct for attorneys who represent corporate clients
before the SEC." Section 307 instructed the SEC to require attorneys to "go
up the [corporate] ladder"' 2 in reporting violations of securities laws and
breaches of fiduciary duties that occur within the corporations they serve. In
the event of a reportable violation, section 307 requires that an attorney (1)
disclose the violation to either the general counsel or chief executive officer
of the company, and (2) if the violation is not properly addressed by the
general counsel or chief executive officer, report the violation to members of
the company's board of directors. 3 When adopting the rules required by
section 307, the SEC did not deviate significantly from the congressional
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
12. 148 CONG. REC. S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards); see also
John Caher, Law Draws Mixed Reviews, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 15.
13. Specifically, section 307 provided:
[T]he Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection
of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation
of issuers, including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or
the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect
to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit
committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the
board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly
by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
2003] 463
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directive set forth in the legislation. In addition to satisfying the specific
requirements of section 307, however, the SEC also defined terms that
Congress failed to define in the legislative text of section 307 and provided
guidance to attorneys regarding how in-house and outside counsel should
address the reporting obligations introduced by section 307.14
B. The Background of Section 307
1. Legislative History
Congress drafted and approved the Act and the President signed it into law
in just over six months. Representative Michael Oxley (R.-Ohio) began
drafting the House version of the corporate-governance bill immediately after
Enron collapsed in December 2001. The House of Representatives approved
House Bill 3763, the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility
and Transparency Act of 2002,1" on April 24, 2002.16 The Senate approved
Senate Bill 2673, the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002,"7 proposed by Senator Paul Sarbanes (D.-Md.), on
July 15, 2002.18 While the two bills addressed similar governance issues, the
Senate advocated much more rigorous provisions. When finalizing the
compromise version, the conference committee preserved most of the Senate
provisions. Although neither bill originally included the specific language
contained in section 307 of the Act, the text ultimately came entirely from
Senate Bill 2673.19
As originally drafted, Senate Bill 2673 failed to include any provisions
addressing attorneys' professional responsibilities. Several Senators added
the text of section 307 to the Senate bill as an amendment from the floor2°
mere hours before the Senate unanimously approved the bill. 2, Senator John
Edwards (D.-N.C.), a former plaintiffs' attorney, together with Senators
14. The SEC's rules, as well as some suggestions regarding how best to comply with them,
are discussed in Part IV of this Article.
15. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002,
H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
16. 148 CONG. REC. H1540 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (approving H.R. 3763).
17. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 2673,
107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
18. 148 CONG. REC. S6778 (daily ed. July 15, 2002).
19. The only provision in House Bill 3763 that addressed the professional responsibilities
of attorneys required the Comptroller General to determine the adequacy of the ABA and SEC
professional conduct rules. H.R. 3763 § 19 ("Study of Model Rules for Attorneys of Issuers").
20. 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
21. 148 CONG. REC. S6778 (daily ed. July 15, 2002).
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Michael Enzi (R.-Wyo.) and Jon Corzine (D.-N.J.), sponsored the amendment
in Senate Bill 2673 that served as the predecessor to section 307 of the Act.22
2. Senator Edwards' Proposal
Senator Edwards introduced the amendment addressing attorneys'
professional responsibilities to their corporate clients in a speech to the Senate
on July 10, 2002. In his speech, Senator Edwards expressed concern that the
Senate had failed to address "an important player in the problem we have had
with corporate misconduct in this country. ' 23 The "player" that Senator
Edwards felt the Senate overlooked in the rush of corporate reform efforts
was, of course, the corporate attorney. "One of the problems we have seen
occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct," Senator Edwards
lamented, "is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility. 24
Senator Edwards, a practicing attorney for twenty years, advised the Senate
that an attorney representing a corporate client has a responsibility to
represent the company, which means the attorney must also represent the
shareholders of the company.25 According to Senator Edwards, attorneys
needed to be reminded that they owe duties of responsibility and loyalty to the
company and the shareholders, rather than the executive officers with whom
they have lunch and talk daily.26 "Anybody who works in corporate America
knows that wherever you see corporate executives and accountants working,
lawyers are virtually always there looking over their shoulder," said Senator
Edwards. 27 "If executives and/or accountants are breaking the law," he
concluded, "you can be sure that part of the problem is that the lawyers who
are there and involved are not doing their jobs. 28
According to Senator Edwards, attorneys have failed to report internal
violations of law to authorities within the companies they represent. Senator
Edwards said:
One of the most critical responsibilities that those lawyers have is,
when they see something occurring or about to occur that violates
22. 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002); see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Lawyer
Responsibilities in the New Disclosure & Corporate Governance Regime, in THE NEW
DISCLOSURE & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME: WHAT EVERY CORPORATE & SECURITIES
LAWYER MUST KNOW NOW 721,738 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No.
1335, 2002).
23. 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
20031
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the law, breaks the law, they must act as an advocate for the
shareholders, for the company itself, for the investors. They are
there and they can see what is happening. They know the law and
their responsibility is to do something about it if they see the law
being broken or about to be broken.29
Senator Edwards proposed that the Senate compel attorneys to fulfill their
responsibilities to corporate clients by including a provision in its corporate
governance bill addressing minimum standards of professional conduct. The
text of the professional responsibility provision proposed by Senator Edwards
substantially resembles the final text of section 307 of the Act. As Senator
Edwards stated on the Senate floor, section 307 "acts in a very simple way.
It basically instructs the SEC .. .to start enforcing this up-the-ladder
principle."30
3. Senator Edwards' Letter to the SEC
When Senator Edwards introduced his provision to the Senate on July 10,
2002, it was not the first time he had raised the issue. On June 18, 2002,
nearly a month before he proposed that the professional responsibility
provision be included in the Senate's corporate governance bill, Senator
Edwards shared with the Senate a letter he had written to SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt.3
Before reading his letter to the Senate, Senator Edwards criticized the SEC
and the ABA for their lack of initiative in addressing the responsibilities of
corporate attorneys. "The American Bar Association ought to take a leading
role here," Senator Edwards stated, "something they have not done thus far.,,3 2
Additionally, Senator Edwards blamed the ABA for the SEC's inaction,
claiming that the SEC "gave up the fight in part because the American Bar
Association opposed their efforts."33 According to Senator Edwards, during
the 1970s and 1980s, the SEC instituted proceedings to enforce minimum
ethical standards for attorneys practicing securities law, yet stopped bringing
those types of actions largely because of ABA opposition.M
29. Id. at S6552.
30. Id.
31. 148 CONG. REC. S5652 (daily ed. June 18, 2002); see Audrey Strauss, Up-the-Ladder
Reporting Under Sarbanes-Oxley, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 2002, at 5.
32. 148 CONG. REC. S5652 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
33. Id.; see Edward Poll, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Spotlight on Individual Officers,
Directors and Legal Counsel, http://www.lawbiz.com/september2002a.html (Aug. 19, 2002).
34. 148 CONG. REC. S5652-53 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (Letter from John Edwards,
Senator, 107th Cong., to Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (June
18, 2002)).
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In his letter to the SEC, Senator Edwards asked the commission to "renew
the SEC's enforcement of corporate lawyers' ethical responsibility to go up
the ladder."35 According to Senator Edwards, it was imperative that SEC
action be revived because the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
had proven ineffective in that it "[has] not recognized mandatory and
unambiguous rules of professional conduct for corporate practitioners, and
rules at the state level are varied and often unenforced."36
When he wrote his letter to the SEC, Senator Edwards knew that the SEC
had already received a similar letter from a number of law professors
expressing concern about attorneys failing to satisfy their professional
responsibilities and asking the SEC to take action. In his own letter, Senator
Edwards reminded the SEC that
[f]orty legal scholars wrote a letter to you suggesting, among other
things, that the Commission require a lawyer representing a
corporation in securities practice to inform the corporation's board
of directors if the lawyer knows the corporation is violating the
Federal securities laws and management has been notified of the
violation and has not acted promptly to rectify it.37
The letter referenced by Senator Edwards was written to the SEC on March
7, 2002, by a group of forty law professors." The professors' letter strongly
influenced Senator Edwards' letter and led to his amendment of the Senate
corporate governance bill, resulting in section 307 of the Act.39 The SEC's
response to the professors' letter - indicating that the SEC would not take
any action on the matter absent congressional action4" - prompted Senator
Edwards to act on his own. He concluded his letter with two questions:
1. Absent further congressional action, does the SEC plan to act
to enforce a minimum standard of professional conduct for lawyers
in securities practice along the lines I have suggested?
35. Id. at S5652 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)
36. Id. (Letter from John Edwards, Senator, 107th Cong., to Harvey Pitt, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission (June 18, 2002)).
37. Id. (Letter from John Edwards, Senator, 107th Cong., to Harvey Pitt, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission (June 18, 2002)).
38. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al., Professor of Law, University of Illinois, to Harvey
L. Pitt, Chairman, Securities Exchange Commission (Mar. 7, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/corporateresponsibility/responsibility-relatedmat.html; see also Strauss, supra note 31,
at 5.
39. Letter from Richard W. Painter et. al. to Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 38.
40. Letter from David Becker, General Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
to Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law, University of Chicago (Mar. 28, 2002), http://www.
abanet.orglbuslaw/corporateresponsibility/responsibility_relatedmat.html.
2003]
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2. If your answer to the preceding question is no, would you be
willing to assist me in carefully crafting legislation to impose this
duty on lawyers?4
Almost a month later, when Senator Edwards proposed to amend the Senate
bill to include the professional responsibility language of section 307, the SEC
had not yet responded.42
4. The Letter from the Law Professors
The position expressed in the law professors' letter can be traced to a 1996
article co-authored by Professor Richard W. Painter, who initiated the law
professors' letter to the SEC.43 The article, written in response to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, argued that Congress should have
imposed disclosure obligations on attorneys similar to those it imposed on
accountants under the same act.'
Picking up in 2002 where Professor Painter's article left off in 1996, the
forty law professors advised the SEC that
[w]hile regulation of accountants has been discussed extensively
at the SEC, in Congressional hearings and in the press, we believe
that attention should also be given to the role of lawyers in
representing public corporations, and in particular to whether
lawyers should inform a client corporation's directors about
violations of the securities laws.45
In what has become a familiar refrain, the professors encouraged the SEC to
require attorneys to report violations of securities laws in the event that
management failed to rectify the violation.'
The letter urged the SEC to amend SEC Rule 102(e), which authorizes the
SEC to disbar an attorney or suspend an attorney from practicing before the
41. 148 CONG. REc. S5653 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (Letter from John Edwards, Senator,
107th Cong., to Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Securities Exchange Commission (June 18, 2002)).
42. 148 CONG. REC. S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
43. Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REv. 225 (1996).
44. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to include Section 10A, which requires an auditor to report illegal activity to
management first, and then to the audit committee or board of directors, if management fails to
act, and then to the SEC if the directors fail to act.
45. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al. to Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 38; see also Bruce
Rubenstein, Lawyers Debate Line Between Attorney and Whistleblower, 12 CORP. LEGAL TIMES
28(2002).
46. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al. to Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 38; see also
Hamermesh, supra note 22, at 737.
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Commission if the attorney "violates the securities laws, assists in someone
else's violation or otherwise engages in unprofessional conduct. ' 47 The
professors proposed that the SEC amend Rule 102(e) to expressly require an
attorney representing a corporate client in connection with its securities law
compliance to inform the client's board of directors if the attorney knows that
the client is violating the securities laws and senior management does not
promptly rectify the violation.48
In its letter responding to the professors, the SEC elected not to amend Rule
102(e) and defended its lack of recent action, arguing that "[t]here has been
a strong view among the bar that these matters are more appropriately
addressed by state bar rules, which historically have been the source of
professional responsibility requirements for lawyers, and have been overseen
by state courts., 49 According to the SEC, any decision to address attorney
misconduct through the SEC, rather than through state ethics rules, "should
be undertaken in the context of Congressional legislation, as opposed to
agency rulemaking."50
In response to the SEC's comments, Senator Edwards prompted Congress
to act on the matter. Section 307 of the Act incorporated the law professors'
recommendation that attorneys be required to report violations "all the way to
the board of directors."'" Additionally, section 60252 codified SEC Rule
102(e), authorizing the SEC to prohibit attorneys from practicing before it in
certain circumstances. 3 Four months after the professors' initial letter to the
SEC, Congress enacted their recommendations by adopting the Act.
5. ABA Recommendations Ignored
Unlike the forty law professors, the American Bar Association had no
noticeable influence on the adoption of section 307 of the Act and the
subsequent SEC rules under section 307. The ABA lobbied against inclusion
in the Senate's corporate governance legislation of any provision addressing
attorneys' professional responsibilities. Its lobbying efforts failed.
47. Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 28; Letter from Richard W. Painter et al. to Harvey L.
Pitt, supra note 38.
48. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al. to Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 38.
49. Letter from David Becker to Richard W. Painter, supra note 40; see Hamermesh, supra
note 22, at 737-38.
50. Letter from David Becker to Richard W. Painter, supra note 40.
51. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al. to Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 38.
52. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 745, 794 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3).
53. SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102 (2002).
2003] 469
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As part of its early opposition to legislation governing attorneys'
responsibilities, the ABA created its Task Force on Corporate Responsibility
(the Task Force).54 Upon appointing the task force, ABA President Robert
Hirshon directed it to "'examine systemic issues relating to corporate
responsibility' and to 'examine the framework of laws and regulations and
ethical principles governing the roles of lawyers, executive officers, directors,
and other key participants.'55
Although the ABA created the Task Force to "allow the ABA to contribute
its perspectives to the dialogue now occurring... on legislative and regulatory
reform to improve corporate responsibility, 5 6 the ABA's efforts were too
little too late. The ABA did not create its Task Force until late March 2002,
nearly three weeks after the law professors' letter to the SEC. Thus, before
the ABA task force could contribute its views concerning corporate attorneys'
professional responsibility, Congress was already well on its way to deciding
the issue.
In the weeks before the Act became law, the ABA made a final effort to
suppress Senator Edwards's amendment to the Senate's corporate governance
bill. The ABA focused these late efforts on Senator Sarbanes, the author of
the Senate's original bill, arguing against the legislation in a letter to him and
insisting that "[s]ince the ABA's Model Rules were approved by the ABA,
the vast majority of state supreme courts have adopted professional standards
based on the Model Rules, and these state court ethical codes have served the
public well over time."57
The ABA argued that the legislation could result in inconsistent and
conflicting ethical rules for attorneys practicing before the SEC. According
to the ABA, the pre-emptive authority granted to the SEC pursuant to Senator
Edwards' provision addressing standards of conduct for attorneys'
professional responsibilities could detrimentally interfere with the attorney-
client relationship. 58 The ABA also argued that Congress had enacted
54. Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA Creates Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility to Examine Issues Affecting Investor Confidence in Public Companies (Mar. 27,
2002), http://www.abanet.org/media [hereinafter ABA Corporate Responsibility Task Force
Press Release].
55. See Hamermesh, supra note 22, at 741-42 (discussing ABA TASK FORCE ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY REPORT (2002), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/preliminary-eport.pdf.
56. ABA Corporate Responsibility Task Force Press Release, supra note 54.
57. Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Governmental Affairs Office, American Bar
Association, to Paul S. Sarbanes, Senator, 107th Cong. (July 19,2002), http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/letters/107th/business071902.html.
58. Id.
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unnecessary legislation because the Task Force had already started addressing
issues relating to attorneys' professional responsibilities to corporate clients.59
The ABA also contended that section 307 of the Act was unnecessary in
light of the Task Force's pending recommendations. The ABA' s Task Force
did not issue its recommendations until July 16, 2002, the day after the Senate
adopted its corporate governance bill including Senator Edwards' provision
directing the SEC to address attorneys' professional responsibilities. At the
time of its letter to Senator Sarbanes, the ABA could offer the Senator only
the assurance that the Task Force proposals would be released "in the near
future," and that "if' the proposals were adopted by the ABA, then "it is likely
that most state courts" would also adopt the proposed changes.6 ° Not
surprisingly, the assurances failed to convince Senator Sarbanes. He
endorsed, and Congress overwhelmingly approved, the Act, including section
307's provisions establishing minimum standards of conduct for attorneys
representing corporate clients before the SEC.6
III. Irreconcilable Differences Between the ABA 's Model Rules
and Section 307?
A. When the Client is More than a Person
1. Model Rule 1.13: Organization as Client
Rule 1.13 of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct resembles
section 307 and the related rules promulgated by the SEC.62 To a certain
extent, Senator Edwards' amendment to the Senate's corporate governance
bill, the law professors' letter to the SEC, the obligations described in section
307, and the subsequent SEC rules are based on the core value expressed by
Rule 1.13: remember who the client is.
Senator Edwards' reminder that "[i]f you are a lawyer for a corporation,
your client is the corporation"63 is reminiscent of Rule 1.13, which states "[a]
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization.""
In addition, Senator Edwards' admonishment that corporate attorneys
represent the company rather than the company's executives mirrors the
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 148 CONG. REC. H5480, S7365 (daily ed. July 25, 2002).
62. MODELRULES OFPROF' LCONDuCTR. 1.13 (2003); see also Arthur D. Burger, Lawyers
as Whistleblowers, LEGALTIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at 22; Ira Schacter, Why Lawyers Should Not
Become Corporate Watchdogs, 21 INT'L. FIN. L. REv. 12 (2002).
63. 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
64. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCr R. 1.13 (2003).
20031
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comment to Rule 1.13, which emphasizes that, although a corporate client may
act through its officers, directors, and employees "[t]his does not mean...
that constituents of an organizational client are the clients."65
It is clear that Senator Edwards and the law professors agreed with the
basic premise of Rule 1.13; it is equally clear, however, that the Senator and
the professors believed that the rule falls well short of the desired mark.
Congress adopted section 307 of the Act to address the shortcomings in the
Model Rules. Although section 307 and the related SEC rules reflect the
fundamental elements of Model Rule 1.13, the SEC's rules under section 307
actually go beyond the ABA's rule. Model Rule 1.13 and the SEC's rules
under section 307 differ primarily because Rule 1.13 is permissive, while the
SEC's rules are mandatory.
The SEC's rules require an attorney to report material violations of
securities law, material breaches of fiduciary duty, and similar material
violations up a company's "chain of command," potentially all the way up to
the company's board of directors.' By contrast, Model Rule 1.13 requires no
action at all unless the attorney knows that a violation exists and the violation
in question relates to the matter for which the attorney was retained.67 Rule
1.13 provides:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action,
intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization.68
In addition to creating no duty to "report up" within a corporation unless
the attorney knows about a violation that relates to the attorney's
representation of the company, Rule 1.13 requires only that an attorney
proceed "as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization."69
65. Id. cmt. 2.
66. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306-09 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)).
67. The Chief Justice of Delaware reads ABA Rule 1.13 as making it clear that "in the
serious corporate fraud case... the lawyer must act promptly to prevent the fraud by going up
the chain of command to the board of directors if necessary." E. Norman Veasey, The
Professional Responsibility of Corporate Counselors, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Oct. 2002, at 16.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003) (emphasis added).
69. Id.; see Francis G. X. Pileggi, Congress Passes New Ethics Rules for Lawyers, DEL. L.
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Additionally, unlike section 307 of the Act and the SEC' s related rules, Rule
1.13 does not specify any particular course of action that an attorney must take
when reporting a violation. Instead, Rule 1. 13 provides:
In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due
consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its
consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation,
the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation
of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning
such matters and any other relevant considerations.7"
If an attorney determines, after "due consideration," that a violation within
a corporation is sufficiently serious to warrant action by the attorney, Rule
1.13 provides only guidance regarding the course of conduct the attorney
should pursue. While Rule 1.13 suggests possible courses of action, it
prohibits the attorney from taking action that is too drastic. Rule 1.13
requires:
Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of
the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to
the representation to persons outside the organization. Such
measures may include among others: (1) asking for reconsideration
of the matter; (2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the
matter be sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the
organization; and (3) referring the matter to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the
matter, referral to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.7
Although Rule 1.13 permits "referring the matter to higher authority,"72 it
does not require the attorney to take such action. Indeed, the ABA's comment
to Rule 1.13 specifically provides that "[c]lear justification should exist for
seeking review over the head of the constituent normally responsible for it."73
2. Law Professors Find Fault with Rule 1.13
Not surprisingly, the law professors who so strongly influenced section 307
of the Act disagreed with several aspects of ABA Model Rule 1.13.
Generally, the law professors argued that the rule fails to adequately address
WKLY., Aug. 21, 2002, at 4.
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. cmt.
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the responsibilities that an attorney owes a corporate client. In addition to
disagreeing with the requirement that an attorney take action only if he
believes that the violation in question "is likely to result in substantial injury
to the organization, 74 the professors disagreed with the permissive nature of
the rule. In their letter to the SEC, they argued that an attorney should be
required, rather than simply permitted, to disclose illegal conduct to a
corporate client's board of directors if the company's senior management
refuses to address the illegal activity.
75
Relying on Model Rule 1.4, which requires an attorney to "communicate
with a client concerning the subject matter of the representation," the
professors argued that "[a] lawyer who represents a corporation in turn is
ethically bound to communicate with the corporation's directors about matters
concerning the representation of which they should be aware."76 According
to the letter, pursuant to Rule 1.4, it is insufficient for an attorney to limit
communication to members of a corporate client's management, particularly
if management refuses to respond appropriately upon learning of illegal
activity. The letter argued that, in such circumstances, the attorney is duty-
bound to inform the directors that the company is violating the law.77
Although the SEC failed to act upon the law professors' letter, Senator
Edwards and Congress did when drafting the text of section 307 of the Act.
3. ABA Task Force Recommends Changes to Rule 1.13
The ABA Task Force agreed with the professors that Rule 1.13 is
inadequate in that it does not require an attorney to report misconduct up the
corporate ladder. In particular, the task force disagreed with the ABA's
comments to Rule 1.13, discouraging an attorney from seeking review by a
higher authority within the company.78 The comment requires clear
justification "'for seeking review over the head of the constituent normally
responsible.' 79 Echoing Senator Edwards' remarks from the Senate floor, the
Task Force, in its report, found that "the lawyer's duty to protect the corporate
client from harm requires the lawyer to serve the interests of the corporation
74. Id.
75. Letter from Richard W. Painter et. al. to Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 38. The law
professors were spurred into action as a result of the ABA's refusal to adopt changes to its
Model Rule 1.13 in February 2002. See Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 28.
76. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al. to Harvey L. Pitt, supra note 38.
77. Id.; see Hamermesh, supra note 22, at 737.
78. ABA TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY REPORT 28,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/prelininary~report.pdf (Jul. 16, 2002)
[hereinafter ABA PRELIMINARY REPORT].
79. Id. at 28 (quoting MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. (2002)).
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and its shareholders rather than the interests of the individual officers or
employees who are acting for the corporation."8 °
The preliminary recommendations issued by the Task Force on July 16,
2002 included a provision supporting disclosure obligations similar to those
set forth in the SEC's rules promulgated under section 307 of the Act.
According to the Task Force:
[I]t would promote corporate responsibility to adopt practices in
which both outside and inside counsel to the corporation have a
direct line of communication through which counsel may proceed
in circumstances in which the lawyer reasonably believes that the
corporate client is involved in a violation or potential violation of
law or in a breach of duty that will adversely affect in a material
manner the interests of the corporation.8'
Despite agreeing in principle with the objectives of section 307 and the
resulting SEC rules, the Task Force objected to granting the SEC the authority
to implement or enforce professional responsibility standards applicable to
attorneys representing clients before the SEC. Instead, the Task Force
recommended amending the Model Rules and developing a set of "best
practices" guidelines for law firms and corporate legal departments.8"
The Task Force recommended amending Rule 1.13 to require an attorney
to disclose criminal and fraudulent misconduct by a company's officers,
directors, and agents to a higher authority in the company, rather than merely
permitting such disclosure.83 Pursuant to the Task Force's proposal, an
attorney discovering illegal activity during the course of his representation
would not have the option to withdraw from representation. Instead, as
required by section 307 and the related SEC rules, the amended rule would
have required the attorney to report misconduct up the corporate ladder, to the
highest authority in the company if necessary."4 The Task Force also
recommended amending Rule 1.13 to require an attorney to report illegal
activity regardless of whether the misconduct "relates" to the attorney's
representation.85
80. Id. at 27.
81. Id. at 25; see Anthony E. Davis, Professional Responsibility: Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 2002, at 3.
82. ABA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 25.
83. The task force recommendation is similar to a proposal rejected by the ABA in 1998
that would have required attorneys to report corporate misdeeds to the board of directors. See
Caher, supra note 12, at 15.
84. ABA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 26.
85. Id.
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Essentially, the Task Force recommended that the ABA amend Rule 1.13
to require the same disclosure obligations contained in the SEC's rules under
section 307 of the Act. Unfortunately for the ABA, the recommendations
came too late, giving Congress time to act in the interim. As a result,
Congress and the President signed the Act into law and neither the ABA nor
its Task Force had a significant impact on section 307 of the Act or the SEC's
related rules.
B. When Communication Should Go Beyond the Client
1. Model Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information
One of the ABA's original objections to section 307 of the Act was that it
could interfere with state confidentiality rules "designed to encourage open
and frank" discussions86 between attorneys and their clients. Section 307,
however, does not require disclosure of confidential information beyond that
already permitted by ABA Model Rule 1.6, "Confidentiality of Information. 87
Likewise, the SEC's rules issued pursuant to section 307 do not require
disclosure prohibited by the confidentiality restrictions of Rule 1.6.
Rule 1.6 provides that, except in very limited circumstances, an attorney
"shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client."88 The
confidentiality of such information is one of the most sacred aspects of the
attorney-client relationship. Although situations may arise that create
exceptions to the strict rule of confidentiality, the circumstances in which Rule
1.6 allows an attorney to disclose confidential information are extremely
narrow. Rule 1.6 permits an attorney to disclose confidential information only
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm;
(2) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with
[the ABA's Model] Rules;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
86. Letter from Robert D. Evans to Paul S. Sarbanes, supra note 57.
87. Legal ethics expert Stephen Gilleers, Vice Dean, New York University Law School
stated, "It is not a 'whistleblower' rule because it does not envision the lawyer going outside the
client." Caher, supra note 12, at 15.
88. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (2003).
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(4) to comply with other law or a court order.8 9
The SEC's rules under section 307 do not require an attorney to disclose
confidential information to anyone outside the corporation; accordingly, the
SEC's rules do not violate Model Rule 1.6. According to Rule 1.13, an
attorney representing an organization "represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents. 90  The SEC's rules require
disclosure only to the company's chief executive officer, general counsel, or
directors, each of whom is a "duly authorized constituent" of the company."
Thus, no direct conflict exists between Rule 1.6 and the requirements of the
SEC's rules issued under section 307 of the Act.
The Act did not specifically limit the SEC's rule-making authority under
section 307, but the legislative history of the provision fails to indicate that
Congress intended section 307 to "empower the SEC to cause attorneys to
breach their attorney/client privilege."92 The SEC could have issued rules
requiring disclosure of confidential information in certain situations without
creating a conflict with state ethics rules following Rule 1.6 because the Rule
specifically provides that confidential information may be disclosed if
reasonably necessary "to comply with other law."93 Any SEC rule requiring
disclosure of confidential information beyond that otherwise permitted by the
Model Rules would have fallen within this provision of Rule 1.6, and
therefore, the SEC rule would have created no conflicts.
Although the SEC chose not to require attorneys to disclose confidential
information to individuals outside of the corporation at the time the SEC first
issued its rules, some state bar associations had already taken the initiative to
expand their confidentiality rules beyond the disclosures permitted under Rule
1.6. Despite the ABA's assertion that its Model Rules are a "comprehensive
and uniform set of ethical standards for lawyers,"94 only a small minority of
states follows Model Rule 1.6." Whereas Model Rule 1.6 prohibits
permissive disclosure of confidential information to prevent anything less than
"death or substantial bodily harm,"96 many states either permit or require an
attorney to disclose confidential information to prevent a client from
89. Id. 1.6(b).
90. Id. 1.13.
91. Such disclosures are commonly referred to as "friendly disclosures" because they
remain within the corporate client. See Burger, supra note 62, at 22.
92. 148 CONG. REC. S6524-02 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
93. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2003).
94. Letter from Robert D. Evans to Paul S. Sarbanes, supra note 57.
95. See ABA PRELMINARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 32.
96. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2003).
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perpetrating a criminal fraud.97 Indeed, some states require disclosure of
confidential information to rectify loss resulting from a crime or fraud that
involved the attorney's services. 98 In contrast to the ethics rules of many
states, the SEC's rules do not require disclosure of confidential information
to individuals outside a corporation in any circumstances.
2. A Surprising Stance by the ABA Task Force
Surprisingly, no suggestion that the ABA revise Rule 1.6 to reflect the
prevailing view adopted by a majority of the states appeared in section 307,
nor did the SEC, the law professors, or Senator Edwards propose it. Instead,
the Task Force recommended amending Rule 1.6 to permit disclosure of
confidential information in circumstances other than those narrowly outlined
in the rule.
In a move that exceeded anything addressed in section 307 of the Act or the
related SEC rules, the Task Force recommended revising Rule 1.6 to require
attorneys to disclose confidential information to prevent a crime or fraud if the
consequences are reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another.99 In its report, the Task Force
adopted a recommendation that the ABA had rejected in February 2002" that
a lawyer be permitted to reveal information relating to the
representation to the extent necessary to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud reasonably certain to result in
substantial economic loss, but only when the lawyer's services
have been or are being used in furtherance of the crime or fraud.
Use of the lawyer's services for such improper ends constitutes a
serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship. The client's
eptitlement to the protection of [Rule 1.6] must be balanced against
the prevention of the injury that would otherwise be suffered and
the interest of the lawyer in being able to prevent the misuse of the
lawyer's services.'o'
The Task Force recommended taking the February 2002 proposal one step
further and mandating disclosure "to prevent client conduct known to the
97. ABA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 32. But see Pileggi, supra note 69, at
4 (discussing Delaware rules of professional conduct).
98. ABA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 32.
99. Id.; see Hamermesh, supra note 22, at 745.
100. The ABA House of Delegates rejected the February 2002 proposal by the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to amend Model Rule
1.6(b)(2), permitting a lawyer to disclose client fraud. Veasey, supra note 67, at 16.
101. ABA PRELIMrNARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 31.
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lawyer to involve a crime." ''"2 The Task Force limited its recommended
disclosure requirement, however, to only those instances in which "the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services, and which is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another." ' 3
In light of the corporate scandals that preceded the Task Force's
recommendations, the ABA was not as quick to dismiss the proposed
amendments to Rule 1.6 as readily as it did in February 2002. On August 12,
2003, as support for the previously rejected recommendation increased after
additional corporate scandals unfolded,"° the ABA House of Delegates
adopted an amendment to Model Rule 1.6 to permit an attorney to reveal
confidential client information if the client is using the attorney's services to
commit a crime or fraud that would cause financial harm to others.10 5
IV Issues Created by, and Precautionary Measures
in Response to, Section 307
A. The Practical Implications of the SEC's Rules Under Section 307
1. General
Unquestionably, section 307 of the Act and the related rules issued by the
SEC raise important philosophical questions regarding federalism and the
future of state-based ethics enforcement and corporate governance. 0 6 Of
greater importance to practitioners, however, are the practical implications of
the reporting obligations imposed by the SEC's rules. Attorneys certainly will
encounter a number of issues, ranging from decreased communication from
corporate clients to increased oversight within law firms, as practitioners and
firms throughout the country begin to incorporate the SEC's reporting
obligations.
In accordance with section 307, the SEC's rules require an attorney to
report up the corporate ladder if the attorney becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation of the securities laws, a material breach of fiduciary duty,
102. Id. at 32.
103. Id.
104. Notwithstanding increased general support for the February 2002 proposed amendments
to Model Rule 1.6, the American Corporate Counsel Association expressly stated that it did not
support the proposed amendment to Rule 1.6. See Written Submission of the ACCA to the
ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 6 (Nov. 11, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/corporateresponsibility/hearingsO2/2002 111 /mcguckin testimony.pdf.
105. News Release, ABA, ABA Adopts New Lawyer Ethics Rules, Urges Fairness in
Military Commission Trials (Aug. 12,2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/aug03/
081203_1.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
106. See Veasey, supra note 67, at 16.
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or any similar material violation.' In reporting "up the corporate ladder," an
attorney serving as outside counsel must disclose the suspected violation or
breach to either the company's general counsel or to both the company's
general counsel and its chief executive officer.' Alternatively, if the
corporate client maintains a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, an
attorney serving as outside counsel may report to the company's Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee instead of reporting to the company's general
counsel or general counsel and chief executive officer.0 9
If the attorney reports evidence of a material violation or breach of
fiduciary duty to the company's general counsel or general counsel and chief
executive officer, and if the person to whom the attorney initially reports fails
to respond appropriately to address the matter, the attorney must report the
evidence of the violation to the company's audit committee, another
committee of independent directors, or the company's full board of
directors.°"0 Upon reporting the suspected violation to the board of directors,
however, the reporting attorney has not necessarily satisfied her legal
obligations. If the attorney believes that the company has failed to address the
reported violation, the attorney must approach the same people within the
company to whom the attorney originally reported, and must explain why the
attorney believes the company has responded inadequately."' Additionally,
the SEC is considering proposed rules that, if adopted, would require an
attorney serving as outside counsel to withdraw from representation of the
client and notify the company in writing that the withdrawal is based on
professional considerations."'
2. Impact in Oklahoma
a) Rule 1.13
As discussed earlier in this Article, the reporting obligations introduced by
section 307 of the Act, and promulgated by the SEC in its related rules,
reflect standards of conduct not entirely irreconcilable with the ABA' s Model
Rules. Like ABA Model Rule 1.13, Rule 1.13 of the Oklahoma Rules of
107. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306-09 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)).
108. Id. at 6306 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)(1)).
109. Id. at 6309-10 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(c)).
110. Id. at 6307 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)).
111. Id. at 6308 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)(9)).
112. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6326 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(d)).
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Professional Conduct expressly states that an attorney "employed or retained
by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents."' 3 As such, Model Rule 1.13, Oklahoma Rule 1.13
and the SEC's rules issued pursuant to section 307 of the Act share an
underlying theme that representing a corporate client does not necessarily
mean representing the interests of the officers, directors, or other individuals
within the company with whom the attorney maintains a close relationship.
As with the ABA's Model Rule 1.13, however, Oklahoma's rule is not
identical to the SEC's rule. The most important distinction between
Oklahoma Rule 1.13 and the SEC's rules is that, while the Oklahoma rule
permits "reporting up" within a corporation in certain instances, the SEC's
rules require attorneys to report material violations of securities laws and
breaches of fiduciary duties to higher authorities within the corporation.
Another requirement of section 307 may concern attorneys practicing law
in Oklahoma. While the SEC's rules do not require attorneys to assume
investigative responsibilities within the corporations they represent, the SEC's
rules extend the circumstances in which attorneys must "report up."
Oklahoma Rule 1.13 requires an attorney to take action in response to a
violation by a corporate client only if the attorney knows that a person within
the company is engaged in a violation of a legal obligation to the company or
a violation of law that may be imputed to the company. Even when an
attorney knows that a violation has occurred, Oklahoma's professional conduct
rules give the attorney absolute discretion in determining how or whether to
address the violation."
4
Unlike Oklahoma Rule 1.13, the SEC's rules do not require that an attorney
know that a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty
exists before obligating her to act." 5 Instead, the SEC's rules require an
attorney to report a suspected violation up the corporate ladder if the attorney
"becomes aware" of evidence of a material violation." 6 As the SEC's rules
define the phrase, "evidence of a material violation" means "credible
evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is
113. OKLA. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2002).
114. Id. 1.13.
115. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rules to
Implement Sarbanes-Oxley Act Provisions Concerning Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys (Nov. 6, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-158.htm.
116. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205.3(b)(1)).
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reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about
to occur."' 17
Confusion regarding the distinction between an attorney "knowing" that a
person within a corporation she represents is engaged in violative conduct, and
an attorney "becoming aware of evidence" of a material violation, may, in
many instances, lead an attorney to overreport suspected violations within a
company. "8 Initially, attorneys may be inclined to be overly zealous in
satisfying the SEC's reporting obligations, particularly while the corporate
scandals of Enron, WorldCom and other companies are fresh in their minds.
Attorneys may prefer to disclose a potential violation based on
unsubstantiated evidence rather than fail to disclose a violation that proves to
be financially disastrous for a company and its investors. Additionally, by
reporting a suspected violation within a company, even if such a report is
premature and ultimately proves to be untrue, an attorney may shift the burden
of responsibility under the SEC's rules to the company's general counsel,
chief executive officer, or Qualified Legal Compliance Committee.
Additionally, the SEC's rules under section 307 may affect the corporate
practices of an Oklahoma attorney because, unlike Oklahoma Rule 1.13, the
SEC's reporting obligations extend beyond matters relating to the attorney's
representation of the corporate client. Instead, the SEC's rules require an
attorney to "report up" within a company if the attorney becomes aware of
evidence that any material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty exists, even if the violation is entirely unrelated to the provision of legal
services. An attorney concerned about fulfilling the SEC's reporting
obligations beyond the scope of her services may deliberately attempt to limit
her exposure to aspects of the client's business not directly related to the
representation. By limiting exposure to a client's business in an attempt to
avoid additional reporting obligations, the attorney will limit the effectiveness
of her representation." 9 Alternatively, an attorney serving as outside counsel
may become so concerned with investigating the various aspects of a
corporate client's business to avoid exposure to penalties under section 307
that the attorney may cease to provide effective representation. While
attorneys do not have investigative duties under section 307, they should not
avoid exposure to additional aspects of their clients' businesses in order to
117. Id. at 6301 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(e)).
118. The American Corporate Counsel Commission makes a similar argument against the
ABA Task Force's recommendation that the standard in the ABA's Model Rule 1. 13 be changed
from "knows" to "reasonably should know." Written Submission of the ACCA to the ABA
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 5-6 (Nov. 11, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/hearings02/20021 11 i/mcguckin-testimony.pdf.
119. See Schacter, supra note 62, at 12.
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avoid circumstances that arouse suspicions of potential violations of securities
law or breaches of fiduciary duty. Attorneys must remember that, regardless
of the reporting obligations imposed by the SEC's rules under section 307, an
attorney's primary objective is effective representation.
b) Rule 1.6
Like many states, Oklahoma Rule 1.6 does not follow the Model Rule.
Oklahoma Rule 1.6 permits an attorney to disclose confidential information
in certain circumstances beyond those narrowly outlined in the Model Rule.
In addition to permitting the attorney to disclose confidential information "to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,"' 2° as set forth in
Model Rule 1.6, the Oklahoma Rules permit, but do not require, an attorney
to reveal confidential information "to disclose the intention of the client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." '121
Oklahoma's ethics rules also permit, but do not require, disclosure of
confidential information to
rectify the consequences of what the lawyer knows to be a client's
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's
services had been used, provided that the lawyer has first made
reasonable efforts to contact the client but has been unable to do
so, or that the lawyer has contacted and called upon the client to
rectify such criminal or fraudulent act but the client has refused or
is unable to do so.' 2
2
Despite the ABA's objections that section 307 could require attorneys to
violate states' ethics codes, compliance with the SEC's rules under section
307 does not violate Oklahoma Rule 1.6 because the SEC's rules under
section 307 do not require attorneys to disclose confidential information to
parties who are not connected with their corporate clients. The rules adopted
require only that attorneys report information to constituents of the corporate
client. 123
120. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6(b)(l) (2003).
121. OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2002).
122. Id. 1.6(b)(2).
123. Even as it was originally proposed, the SEC's rule requiring an attorney to engage in
a "noisy withdrawal" under certain circumstances would not have violated Rule 1.6 because it
did not require disclosure of confidential information. See Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296, 6296 n.2 (Feb. 6, 2003).
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The SEC's rules require attorneys to "report up" only to the highest
authority within the corporation.' 24 As a result, the SEC's rules simply
require attorneys to take the same actions that are otherwise permitted by
Oklahoma Rule 1.13. No provision in section 307 or any rule issued by the
SEC under section 307 requires attorneys to disclose confidential information
to parties outside of the corporation. Accordingly, complying with the
reporting obligations set forth in the SEC's rules under section 307 of the Act
will not cause an attorney to violate Oklahoma Rule 1.6.
Additionally, although the rules issued by the SEC pursuant to section 307
permit disclosure of confidential information in certain circumstances beyond
those currently outlined in Model Rule 1.6, the instances in which the SEC's
rules permit disclosure of confidential information resemble circumstances in
which attorneys in Oklahoma are already permitted to make such disclosures.
Like the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, the SEC's rules permit, but
do not require, an attorney to disclose confidential information related to the
attorney's representation. The attorney may disclose "confidential
information relat[ing] to the representation to the extent the attorney
reasonably believes necessary."' 25 The SEC's rules permit an attorney to
disclose a corporate client's confidential information in order to: (1) Prevent
the company from committing material violation of securities law or breach
of fiduciary duty "that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial
interest or property" of the company or investors;126 (2) Prevent the company
"from committing perjury, . . . suborning perjury, . . . or committing any
act.., that is likely to perpetrate a fraud" upon the SEC; 127 or (3) "[R]ectify
the consequences of a material violation by the [company] that caused, or may
cause, substantial injury to the financial interest [of the company or investors]
in the furtherance of which the attorney's services were used."'' 28
The circumstances in which the SEC's rules permit an attorney to disclose
confidential information resemble the circumstances in which Oklahoma Rule
1.6 permits disclosure of a corporate client's confidential information. In
certain instances, however, the Oklahoma rules permit more disclosure than
the SEC's rules. The SEC's rules permit disclosure of confidential
information to prevent a material °violation only in the specific instances
discussed above. 29 Oklahoma Rule 1.6, however, permits disclosure of "the
intention of the client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
124. Id. at 6307 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)(3)).
125. Id. at 6310 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(d)(2)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
484 [Vol. 56:461
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/22
SECTION 307 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
prevent the crime," regardless of whether the crime will result in financial
injury or property damage to the company or the company's investors, or
whether the crime is against the SEC. 3 ° Additionally, even if the SEC's rules
permitted disclosure of confidential information beyond the disclosures
permitted by the Oklahoma Rules, an attorney practicing in Oklahoma could
still comply with the SEC's rules without violating the Oklahoma Rules
because Oklahoma Rule 1.6 includes a specific provision stating that an
attorney "shall reveal ... information when required by law." 3'
B. Practicing Law Under the New Reporting Obligations
Although neither section 307 nor the related SEC rules require an attorney
to disclose a corporate client's confidential information to anyone outside the
client's organization, a legitimate concern exists that the SEC rules under
section 307 may have a chilling effect on communications between an
attorney and the attorney's primary contacts within a represented
corporation.'32  Officers, employees, and other individuals within a
corporation may be less forthcoming about matters material to the company
when talking to a company's in-house or outside attorneys if they fear that the
SEC's rules under section 307 will compel the attorney to report the
conversation to a higher corporate authority.'33 Attorneys cannot be effective
advocates for their corporate clients if they receive incomplete or inaccurate
information from the individuals within the companies they represent.
To ensure open communication and effective representation of a corporate
client, an attorney must allay any fears that individuals within the company
have about the attorney's reporting obligations pursuant to the SEC's rules
under section 307. At the same time, however, the attorney must be forthright
about the actions that the SEC's rules require her to take if she suspects a
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty.
Regardless of whether the attorney serves as a company's in-house or
outside counsel, the attorney should discuss with the company's management
the reporting obligations imposed by the SEC's rules under section 307,
impressing upon members of management the importance of communicating
with the company's employees and attorneys. Compliance with the SEC rules
under section 307 of the Act requires that everyone within the company knows
her individual duties to the company. Officers, employees, and other
individuals within the company, including the company's attorneys, must
130. OKLA. RuLES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002).
131. Id. § 1.6(c).
132. Stephanie Francis Cahill, Corporate Fraud Law Forces Lawyers to Be Whistle-Blowers,
29 A.B.A.J. E-REPORT 1 (Aug. 2, 2002).
133. Id.
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know that they owe duties to the company, not to any particular director,
officer, or attorney of the company. A company's in-house counsel and
attorneys representing the company as outside counsel should engage in frank
discussions with one another about the roles that they and others within the
company play under section 307.
1. Law Firms Serving as Outside Counsel
If an attorney serving as outside counsel fails to satisfy the reporting
obligations imposed by the SEC's rules, the rules provide that the attorney
"shall" be subject to the civil penalties and remedies available to the SEC for
violation of federal securities law.'34 Additionally, section 602 of the Act
essentially codifies existing SEC Rule 102(e), authorizing the SEC to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who lack integrity or competence,
engage in improper professional conduct, or willfully violate securities
laws.'35 The sanctions available to the SEC in these circumstances include
temporarily or permanently barring an attorney from practicing or appearing
before the SEC. 3 6 More importantly, however, the SEC's authority under
section 602 also extends to anyone who willfully aids and abets a securities
law violation. 137 Consequently, if an attorney within a law firm fails to satisfy
the reporting obligations imposed by the SEC, the attorney's firm could be
subject to the penalties established in section 602 if circumstances indicate
that the firm "aided and abetted" in the violation.
Although it is unlikely that the SEC would prohibit an entire law firm from
practicing or appearing before it, the commission has imposed sanctions on
entire accounting firms in proceedings against individual accountants under
SEC Rule 102(e). 138 The SEC could rely on a "failure to supervise" theory or
evidence of firm-wide improprieties to hold a law firm accountable for "aiding
and abetting" an attorney's failure to satisfy the reporting obligations of the
SEC's rules under section 307.1"9
Because of the potential for firm-wide repercussions resulting from an
attorney's failure to comply with the reporting obligations of the SEC's rules
134. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6314 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205.6(a)).
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 745, 794 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Paul Gonson, Lawyers' Responsibilities and Ethical Obligations Under Sarbanes-
Oxley 25 (Sept. 20, 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
139. See id.
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under section 307, all issues relating to disclosure pursuant to the obligations
established in the SEC's rules should be addressed at the law firm's
management level. A law firm should implement a written "disclosure
compliance" policy outlining the measures the firm plans to enact if
confronted with a situation that potentially triggers the firm's reporting
obligation pursuant to the SEC'S rules. As with any written policy, the law
firm should carefully consider the practical aspects of enacting a disclosure
compliance policy and avoid adopting a policy that contains detailed and
burdensome requirements the firm is unlikely to follow. Although the SEC's
rules specifically provide that no private right of action exists against an
attorney or law firm based upon compliance or noncompliance with the SEC's
rules, maintaining a difficult or impossible disclosure compliance policy
establishes a standard of conduct that could harm the firm in a malpractice
lawsuit or other claims not directly stemming from the Act.140
A law firm's disclosure compliance policy should focus on education,
communication, and supervision. A disclosure compliance policy serves two
purposes. First, the policy should dictate the law firm's actions in the event
that a situation arises requiring the firm to determine whether its "reporting
up" obligation has been triggered. Second, a consistently enforced disclosure
compliance policy protects the law firm from allegations of failure to
supervise and will prevent firm-wide improprieties with regard to the
reporting obligations imposed by the SEC pursuant to section 307.141 A law
firm can rely on its disclosure compliance policy to demonstrate that the firm
does not condone or tolerate anything less than complete compliance with the
obligations set forth in the SEC's rules under section 307.142
Depending on the size and internal structure of the law firm, a firm should
consider a disclosure compliance policy that includes a "disclosure
140. Ethics commentator Lawrence J. Fox refers to section 307 of the Act as the "Unlimited
Lawyers' Liability Act of 2002," as a result of the potential lawsuits that maybe brought against
attorneys who fail to discover, and subsequently report, a violation within a corporate client.
Burger, supra note 62, at 22.
141. One author suggests that law firms should react to the federal regulation of attorneys
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by establishing a full "loss-prevention program." Such a
program would include, among other things, appointing a professional responsibility partner and
establishing quality control measures designed to ward off legal malpractice. Todd S. Lundy
& Connelle K. Durvall, Law Firm Ethics Have Consequences, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 2002, at
D14.
142. The theory is similar to the approach adopted in 1991 in the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Guidelines for the Sentencing of Organizations, which enables companies to
reduce penalties for certain violations if they have an "effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law." BNAIACCA COMPLIANCE MANUAL: PREVENTION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
ch. 1, § Al (1995).
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compliance committee" responsible for addressing suspected violations of
securities law or breaches of fiduciary duty within a represented corporation
that may give rise to the law firm's "reporting up" obligation. The committee
should strive to preserve the lead attorney's relationship with the client, while
also ensuring compliance with the SEC's rules. In order to best achieve this
goal, the firm's disclosure compliance policy should require any attorney
within the firm to notify the disclosure compliance committee if the attorney
encounters evidence that may invoke the firm's obligation to "report up." To
be effective, the members of the disclosure compliance committee must
remain objective and unbiased when following up on a suspected violation.
A committee member with a conflict of interest regarding a client should
recuse herself from committee discussions about the law firm's reporting
obligations relating to the client.
Upon being advised of a situation that potentially triggers the law firm's
obligation to "report up," the firm's disclosure compliance committee must
make a number of subjective determinations. The committee must initially
determine whether the facts of the particular situation give rise to the
obligation to report to a higher authority within the corporation. Among other
things, the disclosure compliance committee must consider whether the
evidence presented to the committee indicates a "material violation of...
securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty, .. . or a similar material
violation."' 43
If the firm's disclosure compliance committee determines that the reported
activity materially violates a securities law, breaches a fiduciary duty, or
otherwise invokes the law firm's reporting obligation pursuant to the SEC's
rules under section 307 of the Act, the committee next must address how to
satisfy the firm's reporting obligation. In deciding how to proceed, the
disclosure compliance committee must make politically sensitive decisions
that may have a significant detrimental effect on the law firm's relationship
with its corporate clients, especially with clients' chief executive officers and
general counsels.'" The determinations the committee must make include:
(1) what attorney within the firm will be responsible for reporting the
evidence of a suspected violation or breach to the client, (2) whether the
matter should be addressed initially to the company's general counsel, to both
the general counsel and the chief executive officer, or to the company's
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, if one exists, and (3) whether the
143. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,6303 (Feb. 6,2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205.2(i))..
144. See Lundy & Durvall, supra note 141, at D14.
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firm's initial report of the evidence of a violation or breach should be oral or
written.
Regardless of whether the firm communicates its initial report of a
suspected violation by a corporate client orally or in writing, the law firm
should carefully document and maintain all communications and actions
during the course of a disclosure compliance investigation. Although the SEC
rules do not specifically require the attorney or law firm reporting a violation
by a corporate client to document the report and the company's response, it
will serve the best interest of the attorney and the law firm to maintain such
records.
If a reporting attorney discloses evidence of a suspected violation to a
company's Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, the attorney and law firm
have satisfied their responsibilities under the SEC's rules. Upon an attorney
reporting evidence of a suspected violation to the company's general counsel,
or general counsel and chief executive officer, however, the law firm's
disclosure compliance committee must determine whether the client responds
appropriately to the matter. Pursuant to the SEC's rules under section 307, a
company's response to a report of a violation within the company must
provide a basis for the attorney who reported the matter to reasonably believe
that either (1) no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur; (2) the company has adopted remedial measures that can be expected
to prevent, remedy, or otherwise address the violation; or (3) the company has
retained an attorney to review the reported evidence of a violation and has
implemented remedial measures recommended by the attorney or been advised
that the company has a defensible position.'45
If the company's general counsel or chief executive officer fails to
adequately address a reported violation, the reporting attorney must report the
violation to the company's audit committee, another committee of independent
directors, or the full board of directors. If, upon receiving a report of a
violation within the company, the members of the company's board of
directors fail to respond appropriately in addressing the violation, the law
firm's disclosure compliance committee must ensure that the firm complies
with the SEC requirements. Currently, the SEC's rules merely require the
attorney to explain to the company the reasons for believing that the company
145. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185,68 Fed. Reg. 6296,6298 (Feb. 6,2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205.2(b)).
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has not made an appropriate response;14 6 however, the SEC has proposed rules
that require the attorney to withdraw from representation. '47
Although the SEC has not adopted the proposed rules requiring noisy
withdrawal, the proposed rule is still being considered by the SEC, and an
alternative rule is also being considered. Pursuant to the rule originally
proposed by the SEC, if an attorney reported a violation of law or breach of
fiduciary duty within a corporate client to all of the corporate officials and
board members the SEC required her to inform, and the company continued
to fail to respond appropriately to address the reported violation, the SEC has
proposed rules that, if adopted, would require that the attorney engage in a
"noisy withdrawal" in certain circumstances.'48 The proposed rules would
require an attorney to engage in a noisy withdrawal if the company failed to
respond appropriately to a report of a material violation that the attorney
reasonably believed was ongoing or about to occur and was likely to result in
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the company or its
investors.
If the SEC adopts the original rule as proposed, it would require an attorney
engaging in a noisy withdrawal to: (1) withdraw from representing the
corporate client, indicating that the withdrawal is based on professional
considerations; (2) give written notice to the SEC within one day of the
withdrawal, indicating that the withdrawal was based on professional
considerations; and (3) promptly disaffirm to the SEC any document
submitted to the SEC that the attorney prepared or assisted in preparing that
the attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading. 1
49
Pursuant to an alternative rule proposed by the SEC, a withdrawing
attorney would not be required to notify the Commission of her withdrawal,
nor would she be required to disaffirm documents filed with the Commission.
Instead, the alternative rule, if adopted, would require the withdrawing
attorney to notify the company in writing that the withdrawal is based on
professional considerations. The company receiving such a notice from a
withdrawing attorney would then to required to file a report with the SEC
146. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6308 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)(9)).
147. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6326 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(d)(1)).
148. Id.; Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,688 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(1)).
149. Id.
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providing information about the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal
notice. If a company failed to report a withdrawal notice, the SEC's
alternative proposed rule would permit, but not require, the withdrawing
attorney to inform the Commission that she provided the company with a
withdrawal notice based on professional considerations. 50
As discussed in Part III of this Article, many state ethics rules permit
attorneys to disclose clients' confidential information in circumstances beyond
the limited circumstances set forth in ABA Model Rule 1.6. The Oklahoma
Rules of Professional Conduct permit an attorney to make a noisy withdrawal
if the client uses the attorney's services in the course of criminal or fraudulent
conduct.'5' As part of a law firm's attempt to "encourage" a corporate client
to take appropriate action to remedy a reported violation, a firm's disclosure
compliance committee should consider advising the client that, unless the
violation is addressed properly, the attorney may be obligated to withdraw in
the manner set forth in the SEC's proposed rules, if such rules are adopted, or
as permitted by the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct.' Such a noisy
withdrawal "sends up red flags for the world to see,""' but enables the
attorney to avoid disclosing confidential information to parties outside of the
corporation.
In addition to making decisions and addressing matters related to evidence
of securities law violations and breaches of fiduciary duties by a law firm's
corporate clients, a law firm's disclosure compliance committee also must
educate attorneys within the firm about the firm's disclosure compliance
policy and about the responsibilities of the firm and the individual attorney
pursuant to the SEC's rules under section 307 of the Act. In particular, a
disclosure compliance committee must ensure that senior attorneys within the
firm understand that they can and will be held responsible for the actions of
the subordinate attorneys they supervise who appear and practice before the
SEC. The SEC's rules specifically require a supervising attorney to "make
reasonable efforts" to ensure that a subordinate attorney complies with the
SEC's reporting obligations.'54 Additionally, upon receiving a report from a
150. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6328 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(d)(1)).
151. OKLA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2002).
152. The ABA comment to Model Rule 1.6 makes it clear that, in certain circumstances, the
ABA rules permit an attorney to give notice of withdrawal, including withdrawing or
disaffirming any opinion, document, or affirmation. Id.
153. Veasey, supra note 67, at 16.
154. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185,68 Fed. Reg. 6296,6313 (Feb. 6,2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205.4(b)).
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subordinate attorney of evidence of a violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty within a represented corporation, the SEC's rules require the
supervising attorney to assume responsibility for complying with the SEC's
obligations to "report up" within the corporation. 1
55
The SEC defines a subordinate attorney as one who appears and practices
before the SEC under the supervision or direction of another attorney. 156 As
such, although a subordinate attorney must comply with the SEC's rules, the
rules deem a subordinate attorney to have satisfied the SEC's reporting
obligations if she reports evidence of a material violation or breach within a
represented corporation to her supervising attorney. Although a subordinate
attorney may report directly to a client's general counsel, chief executive
officer, or Qualified Legal Compliance Committee if the supervising attorney
fails to satisfy the SEC's reporting obligations, the SEC's rules do not require
that the subordinate attorney take such action.' 7
Nevertheless, a law firm's disclosure compliance policy should require a
subordinate attorney to report directly to the firm's disclosure compliance
committee, either in addition to reporting to the supervising attorney or instead
of reporting to the supervising attorney. By requiring subordinate attorneys
to report to the law firm's disclosure compliance committee, the firm avoids
the situation contemplated by the SEC' s rules in which a supervising attorney
fails to act upon a subordinate attorney's report, presumably because of the
nature of the supervising attorney's relationship with the corporate client. The
law firm also avoids the untenable situation of having a subordinate attorney
report a suspected violation directly to a corporate client. Intervention by the
disclosure compliance committee ensures that the firm handles a subordinate
attorney's report of a suspected violation with both objectivity and the best
interests of the firm in mind, rather than with the best interest of the
supervising attorney in preserving her relationship with the client.
2. In-House Legal Departments
Because the reporting obligations imposed by the SEC' s rules under section
307 of the Act apply to in-house attorneys as well as to outside attorneys, a
company's general counsel should consider implementing a disclosure
compliance policy similar to that proposed for an outside law firm.'58 A
155. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(c)).
156. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.5(a)).
157. See id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.5(d)).
158. At least one chapter of the American Corporate Counsel Association even began
considering the special procedures that should be adopted by in-house legal departments in
connection with the reporting obligations introduced by Section 307 before the SEC issued its
rules. Memorandum Provided by the ACCA Central Pennsylvania Chapter, Sarbanes-Oxley
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company's disclosure compliance policy will serve the same purpose as a law
firm's disclosure compliance policy, but a company's in-house policy should
differ from a law firm's policy in at least two important ways. First, the
company's policy should be company-wide, applicable to all employees, not
just the attorneys. Second, the company's disclosure compliance policy
should include specific obligations applicable to both in-house attorneys and
attorneys representing the company as outside counsel.
The company's general counsel, assisted by other members of the
company's senior management, should prepare the company's disclosure
compliance policy, and the board of directors should review, approve, and
adopt it. A company's disclosure compliance policy should require officers,
employees, and agents of the company, including attorneys and accountants,
to report to the general counsel in the event of a suspected material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty within the company. The
company's policy also should provide alternate means of reporting, such as
establishing a system that encourages anonymous reporting of suspected
violations.'59 The policy should expressly require the company's general
counsel to meet with the company's chief executive officer periodically to
review all issues raised in connection with, and all reports made pursuant to,
the company's disclosure compliance policy. The policy also should require
the company's chief executive officer to report to the board of directors at
least annually to discuss any reports made pursuant to the policy, even if the
reports ultimately fail to prove that a violation occurred or is ongoing. In this
manner, the chief executive officer and the board of directors can oversee the
disclosure compliance process and ensure that the general counsel and the
company's legal department address potential disclosure compliance issues in
an appropriate manner.
In the event of a reported violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty, the disclosure compliance policy adopted by a company should reflect
the specific requirements of the SEC's rules under section 307. When a
company's general counsel receives a report of a material violation or breach
within the company from an attorney who serves as outside counsel, the
company's general counsel essentially has two options: (1) instigate an
Summary and Analysis (July 29,2002), http://www.acca.comflegres/enron/sarbanes-oxley-act
.pdf.
159. Such a disclosure system could be incorporated into the procedures required by Section
301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, pursuant to which a company's audit committee must establish
procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints (including anonymous
submissions) regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d-3).
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investigation of the evidence supporting the reported violation or breach; or
(2) report the alleged violation to the company's Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee, if the company has established such a committee. 60
Alternatively, a company may implement a disclosure compliance policy
that establishes a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee and requires the
company's general counsel to report any reported violations such committee.
The SEC defines "Qualified Legal Compliance Committee," under section
307 as a committee established by a company's board of directors that is
specifically authorized to investigate reported evidence of material violations
of securities law or breaches of fiduciary duty within the company.
161
Pursuant to the SEC's rules, a company's Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee must establish written procedures that enable it to receive reports
of suspected violations within the company on a confidential basis. 1
62
If the general counsel chooses to investigate the reported violation and
determines that no material violation exists, the general counsel must report
its investigation and findings to the attorney who reported the suspected
violation initially. 63 If, upon completion of an investigation, the general
counsel believes that a violation exists within the company, the general
counsel must "take all reasonable steps" to ensure that the company adopts
appropriate remedial measures. 64 Furthermore, the general counsel must
report the remedial measures adopted to the outside attorney who initially
reported the suspected violation. 65
If a company establishes a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee before
it receives a report of a suspected violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty, the company's general counsel probably bears a lesser burden.
If a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee exists, an outside attorney may
report directly to it, instead of reporting to the company's general counsel. 1
66
Additionally, the general counsel may report a suspected violation to the
committee, alleviating the general counsel's obligation to investigate the
suspected violation.
Upon establishing a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, a company's
board of directors must grant the committee the authority and responsibility
160. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8185,68 Fed. Reg. 6296,6307 (Feb. 6,2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)(2)).
161. Id. at 6304 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)).
162. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(2)).
163. Id. at 6307 (to be codified at 17 C..F.R. § 205.3(b)(2)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 6309 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(c)).
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to inform the company's general counsel and chief executive officer of any
reported violation and to decide whether a report of a material violation
requires an investigation.'67 Additionally, if a company's Qualified Legal
Compliance Committee determines that a reported violation requires
investigation, the committee must have the authority and responsibility to take
such action as may be necessary to ensure a proper investigation. The
committee needs the authority and responsibility to: (1) notify the audit
committee or full board of directors; (2) initiate an investigation to be
conducted either by the company's general counsel or by outside attorneys;
and (3) retain additional experts if the committee deems it necessary.'6
Moreover, the committee must have the authority and responsibility to
recommend that the company adopt appropriate remedial measures to address
the violation.'69 The committee also must inform the company's general
counsel and chief executive officer, as well as the company's board of
directors, of the results of the investigation and of the remedial measures
recommended. 7 ° Finally, if the company fails to act upon the recommen-
dation, the committee must have the authority and responsibility to take such
action as is deemed appropriate by the majority of the committee, including
notifying the SEC of the company's failure to act upon the recommendation. 7'
Because the SEC's rules under section 307 do not require that a company
establish a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, a company should
consider carefully whether to create one. Some companies may prefer that the
company's general counsel bear primary responsibility for overseeing issues
that arise in connection with the SEC's reporting obligations. Other
companies may decide that it is more appropriate, especially from an
investor's point of view, for the company to establish an independent
committee responsible for ensuring compliance with the SEC's reporting
obligations. Establishing a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee provides
an alternative means of reporting and investigating evidence of a violation
within a company when either an attorney who serves as outside counsel or
the company's general counsel suspects that a violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty exists within the company. An outside attorney
reporting a suspected violation may choose to report the violation to either the
company's general counsel, general counsel and chief executive officer, or to
the company's Qualified Legal Compliance Committee. Despite the apparent
advantage of having multiple reporting alternatives, the fact that a company's
167. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(3)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Qualified Legal Compliance Committee must consist of at least one member
of the company's audit committee and two other independent directors may
deter some companies from instituting such a committee. As a practical
matter, it may be difficult for a company to find independent directors willing
to serve on the committee because of the increased responsibilities and
potential liabilities of the committee members. In determining whether to
create a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, a company should remember
that the committee can comprise the same members as the company's audit
committee or another existing committee, provided that its members satisfy
the SEC's independence requirements. 72
Regardless of whether a company establishes a Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee or relies on its general counsel to ensure compliance with the
SEC's rules, the key to a successful disclosure compliance process is
communication. A company's general counsel, chief executive officer, board
of directors and, if established, Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, must
make personnel at all levels aware of their individual duties. The company's
general counsel, however, ultimately bears the responsibility for creating and
maintaining open lines of communication within the company.
The SEC's rules deem a company's general counsel to be a "supervising
attorney."' 73 Accordingly, the responsibility of ensuring compliance within
the company's legal department falls upon the general counsel. Thus, a large
part of the general counsel's role in connection with a company's disclosure
compliance policy relates to facilitating communication and providing
opportunities for early detection of potential violations of securities law or
breaches of fiduciary duty within the company. The general counsel should
meet privately on a regular basis with the company's officers, other in-house
attorneys, the Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, if established, and,
perhaps, the company's board of directors. '74 Frequent and relatively informal
communication increases the likelihood that the general counsel will discover
a potential violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty in its
preliminary stages. The general counsel also should meet regularly with
subordinate attorneys within the legal department to ensure that they comply
with the SEC's rules.
Although the general counsel owes a duty of loyalty to the company and not
to the chief executive officer or any other officer or employee of the company,
the nature of the general counsel's relationship with company personnel - the
chief executive officer, in particular - clearly creates the potential for an
172. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(1)).
173. Id. at 6313 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.4(a)).
174. See ABA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 36-39; see also Hamermesh, supra
note 22, at 748-49.
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awkward situation during the course of an internal investigation about a
suspected violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty. In some
instances, the general counsel risks her job simply by investigating. Early
detection of conduct or activities indicative of a potential violation creates an
opportunity for the general counsel to conduct a preliminary investigation and
possibly deter the violative conduct before it develops into a matter that must
be reported.
When a company retains outside counsel, the general counsel should
provide the attorney with a copy of the company's disclosure compliance
policy and emphasize that the policy governs not only the company's
obligations under the SEC's rules but also the activities of the company's
outside counsel.'75 Additionally, the general counsel should inquire as to
whether the outside attorney adheres to any other disclosure compliance
policy that might conflict with the company's policy. If the attorney serving
as outside counsel indicates that she follows a law firm's disclosure
compliance policy, the company's general counsel should request additional
information about its terms. Certainly, the company's general counsel will
want to be advised if a law firm's policy requires the firm's attorney to make
initial reports under section 307 to a person or committee other than the
general counsel.
The company's disclosure compliance policy also should require each
outside attorney to provide an annual certification to the company's general
counsel stating that the attorney knows of no conduct that would trigger a
reporting obligation under the SEC's rules. Regardless of whether an outside
attorney works with or directly reports to the general counsel, a company's
disclosure compliance policy must ensure that procedures exist that give all
attorneys serving as outside counsel access to the general counsel, as well as
the company's chief executive officer, Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee, or another independent committee of the board of directors, if
necessary. 7
6
V Conclusion
Although the SEC's rules under section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
represent a significant shift in the oversight of attorneys' professional
responsibilities, the rules do not represent the end of the attorney-client
175. See ABA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 78, at 39-42.
176. This aspect of a company's disclosure compliance policy will be particularly important
if the SEC adopts the "noisy withdrawal" proposal. Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Release No. 33-8186,68 Fed.
Reg. 6324 (Feb. 6, 2003).
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relationship between attorneys and their corporate clients. Nor do the rules
under section 307 conflict irreconcilably with the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. As discussed, the ABA is poised to adopt changes that
would effectively eliminate any perceived conflicts that exist between the
SEC's rules under section 307 and the ABA's Model Rules. In the meantime,
as attorneys consider how best to comply with the specific requirements of the
SEC's rules under section 307, they should consider how to most effectively
incorporate the spirit of the corporate reforms into their daily practices to
avoid being prominently featured in a scandal similar to those that led to the
enactment of the Act in the first place.
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